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Abstract
Background: Many areas of biology are open to mathematical and computational modelling. The application of discrete,
logical formalisms defines the field of biomedical ontologies. Ontologies have been put to many uses in bioinformatics. The
most widespread is for description of entities about which data have been collected, allowing integration and analysis
across multiple resources. There are now over 60 ontologies in active use, increasingly developed as large, international
collaborations. There are, however, many opinions on how ontologies should be authored; that is, what is appropriate for
representation. Recently, a common opinion has been the ‘‘realist’’ approach that places restrictions upon the style of
modelling considered to be appropriate.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we use a number of case studies for describing the results of biological
experiments. We investigate the ways in which these could be represented using both realist and non-realist approaches;
we consider the limitations and advantages of each of these models.
Conclusions/Significance: From our analysis, we conclude that while realist principles may enable straight-forward
modelling for some topics, there are crucial aspects of science and the phenomena it studies that do not fit into this
approach; realism appears to be over-simplistic which, perversely, results in overly complex ontological models. We suggest
that it is impossible to avoid compromise in modelling ontology; a clearer understanding of these compromises will better
enable appropriate modelling, fulfilling the many needs for discrete mathematical models within computational biology.
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Introduction
Ontologies are now widely used for describing and enhancing
biological resources and biological data, largely following on from
the success of the Gene Ontology [1]. Ontologies have been used
for many purposes, from schema integration to value reconcillia-
tion to query interfaces [2]. Ontologies have also become a
cornerstone of computational biology and bioinformatics. As
computationally amenable artifacts they are, themselves, a direct
part of computational biology; many computational biologists are
involved in their production and maintenance. Many more use
ontologies to summarise their data, often by looking for over-
representation [3], as the basis for drawing computational
inferences about data [4], or as the basis for determining semantic
similarity [5]. Even those not making direct computational use of
ontologies are likely to come into contact with them, for example,
when preparing annotation as part of their data release [6].
It is, therefore, of vital interest to computational biologists that
ontologies for use within biomedicine are fit for purpose. One
effort that aims to increase the quality of the ontologies available
within biomedicine is the ‘‘OBO Foundry’’ [7]. The main tool that
it uses for this is ‘‘an evolving set of shared principles governing
ontology development’’. The initial eleven principles of the OBO
Foundry [8] were largely concerned with what might be termed
‘good engineering practice’ (ontologies must, for example, be
openly available, with a common syntax, well documented, and
used). These principles have later been joined by a further eleven
[9]; these include principles such as ‘‘textual definitions will use the
genus-species form’’, ‘‘Use of Basic Formal Ontology’’ and, the
somewhat quixotic, ‘‘terms […] should correspond to instances in
reality’’. These stem not from engineering practice, but from a
perspective called realism.
The many different uses for ontologies that we have described
are reflected in different understandings and methodologies about
how and what to represent in an ontology. Over the last few years,
for many uses the paradigm has moved from ‘‘a conceptualization
of the application domain’’ toward ‘‘a description of the key
entities in reality’’; it is this latter approach that defines realism
[10]. This approach to ontology is typified by the Basic Formal
Ontology (BFO); a small upper-ontology for use within science in
general and biomedical ontology building in particular [11].
There has been significant discussion regarding the possibility of
representing only ‘‘real entities’’ in computational ontologies [12].
Likewise, there has been significant discussion about the
philosophy surrounding realism and the role of ontology in its
representation [10]. While it is argued by some that it is possible to
represent only reality when making a domain description, there
has, however, been little discussion on whether it is necessarily
desirable to do so.
In this paper, we consider the implications that realism has for
the choices that are open to the ontologist while they are modelling
their domain of interest. In particular, we consider the implications
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that this has for the computational capabilities of any resultant
ontology, in terms of its ability to represent scientific knowledge in
a computationally amenable form, as well as the ability to perform
automated inference or statistics over this knowledge. We suggest
that the application of realism results in ontologies that are over-
complex, awkward or limited; as such, realism falls far short of its
aim of increasing the fitness-for-purpose of ontologies. This
approach, therefore, is unlikely to fulfil the needs of computational
biologists whom form a substantial part of both the user and
developer community for bio-ontologies.
Methods
In this paper, we take the approach of a number of worked
exemplars; this is a complementary approach to an in-depth
consideration of the modelling decisions for a particular area or
particular ontology, which we have used previously [13], as it
allows broader conclusions about the general principles of
ontology development. For each section, as well as the main
exemplars, a number of related examples are briefly discussed, to
reinforce that the issues raised are, indeed, general.
The exemplars have been selected by several criteria. First, all
the main exemplars are all taken from within biomedicine; this is
also true for the majority of the related examples. Second, we have
chosen exemplars that provide as wide a coverage of biology as
possible. For practical reasons, third, we have chosen exemplars
where the underlying science is relatively basic to much of biology
and is likely to be immediately clear to the reader without
significant explanation.
We have chosen exemplars requiring as little knowledge of
specific ontologies as possible. We refer to only three. The first is
BFO (see ‘‘What is Realism?’’) which is a canonical example of a
realist ontology. BFO is described as a cross-domain, upper-
ontology; as a result, most terms fail the criteria given above; they
are of poor biomedical relevance, and are not basic science or
immediately clear. We have, therefore, also used PATO (see
http://obofoundry.org/wiki/index.php/PATO:Main_Page); this
defines ‘‘qualities’’ that we might consider attributes of other
entities; so, the authors of this paper have a height, weight and
shape, all of which are considered to be qualities of the authors.
Finally, we use the relationship ontology [14]; this describes the
relations between entities. So, for example, the height of the
author inheres_in the author.
As discussed in this and other works [15,16], ‘‘realism’’ is itself
poorly defined. Where this lack of definition makes the
consequences of realism hard to determine, we have taken the
practical course, of showing the consequences as they play out in
practice; to an extent, therefore, these three ontologies are not only
exemplars for realism, but define it, as it is currently practiced. In
short, for this paper, when we say ‘‘realism’’, we largely mean
‘‘realism as practiced by BFO’’. We do not claim, in this paper, to
address all the philosophical perspectives that through time carried
the name ‘‘realism’’.
Results
What is Realism?
Building ontologies based on reality is obviously appealing to
most scientists; after all the study of reality to determine its
behaviour and laws is the goal of scientists. A brief consideration,
however, shows that this notion cannot define a methodology for
the building of ontologies.
Within the context of science ‘‘reality’’ would normally be taken
to mean our experimental or observational data; but the statement
that science (ontologies) should be based on experimental or
observational data is a truism and, as such, has no explanatory
power. The ‘‘real’’ in realism refers, in fact, to the belief that the
categories that we can use to divide entities are, themselves, real.
This distinction stems from an old argument from philosophy;
realism against conceptualism. Again, both sides of the argument
agree that the world we can percieve, and as scientists, experiment
on, is mind-independent. The conceptualist, however, argues that
the categories that they term concepts are a product of social
agreement. Conversely, the realist argues that these categories that
they term universals are themselves real, that is mind independent in
their own right, like the entities they describe.
This distinction may seem fairly confusing; as Russell [15] says
‘‘if I have failed to make Aristotle’s theory of universals clear, that
is (I maintain) because it is not clear’’. In fact, there is a third
possibility that is a more empirical view—that is, if categories (or
other models) help in describing and predicting experimental data,
then they are useful regardless of whether they are real or
otherwise [17]. As an example, the Mendelian notion of
segregating units of inheritance was defined and useful many
years before a complete mechanistic description of their cause was
available. In this context, we note that there is no commonly used
term to express this form of category; most commonly, ‘‘concept’’
is used.
For a field with a core activity of providing definitions, there is
surprisingly little agreement on the meaning of the word
‘‘ontology’’; as there have been many papers on the topic, we
consider just a few that reflect the distinction between these
approaches. Probably the most commonly cited definition [18]
describes an ontology as ‘‘a specification of a conceptualization’’.
This definition emphasises the formality (i.e. logical and, therefore,
computationally amenable) aspect to ontology development.
This is countered with a realist definition; while the require-
ments from Gruber’s definition—a formal specification—are
necessary, realist ontologies add the requirement that ‘‘the nodes
and edges correspond not to concepts but, rather, to entities in
reality’’ [19].
What does ‘‘reality’’ in this context actually mean? Definitions
such as ‘‘that which exists’’ are strangely circular leaving the
question of what ‘‘exists’’ means. Smith [12] adds the priviso that
reality is ‘‘captured in scientific laws’’. Being a scientific law is not
strictly enough, as some are later shown to be wrong, but a
scientific law is the current best attempt at reality; this possibility
does not make an ontology non-realist. For a realist ontology, the
nodes are ‘‘universals’’—entities in reality—rather than concepts;
at least one particular must exist for every universal.
This still leaves the difficulty of applying the realist definition in
practice. So most scientists will happily accept, for example, that a
cell is real as it is an entity that can be observed, interacted with
and manipulated. However, concepts such as ‘‘function’’ [13] have
raised more discussion [20]; is this ‘‘real’’ or just a word biologists
use as a point of reference? While the definition involving ‘‘entities
in reality’’ maybe of philosophical interest, they are hard to turn
into a specific assay; how to test whether a particular concept is,
also, a universal. Instead of a clear assay for existence, realism
offers direction about what concepts are NOT reality, rather than
those that are reality. For example, and perhaps ironically given
the negative practical definition of reality, a statement such as:
Dog is_a not Cat
is not held to be a statement about reality as it is a logically
constructed example of subsumption (an is_a relationship); there is
no real universal containing particular not Cats in existence.
Likewise,
Dog is_a (Dog or Cat)
Realism and Biology
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as the existence of particular Dogs and Cats does not mean
that there are any particular Dog or Cats (examples modified
from [12]).
This is not meant to provide a complete introduction to
‘‘realism’’, but to provide a grounding for the discussion that
follows; we will consider the issues raised by realism, throughout
the paper. A more philosophical treatment of realism is given by
Merrill [16]. It is useful to note that Gruber’s [18] statement that
‘‘And it [a computational ontology] is certainly a different sense of
the word than its use in philosophy.’’. In this paper, we are
concerned with the ontologies as computational artefacts.
To summarise, a realist approach to ontology says that the
categories or universals in to which objects or particulars fall have
an existence in their own right. It is these universals and only these
universals that a realist approach says should be the nodes within
an ontology. In this paper we examine whether this approach is an
adequate means to provide an account for the data produced by
biomedicine.
Models that represent reality
In this section, we suggest that many universals have a range of
representations. In some cases, the choice of representation may
be obvious, such as length which has a natural scientific
representation in SI units. In many cases, however, there is no
clear set of criteria for choosing between representations. We
consider the way that one quality, colour, could be represented
ontologically.
Colour is a complex phenomenon. The colour of an object or
other phenomena arises, in part, from that object and, in part,
from the eye that perceives it.
A representation of the physical reality would be an account of
the reflection, transmission and perception of light by an organism.
Such an account of the reality of light and its perception might
cover the following facts: Chlorophyll is green in reflection and red
in transmission; a flower petal appears white to a human, but has
UV stripes to a bee; the plant leaf and the algae appear green to
humans, but have different reflection spectra because their
chlorophyll co-ordinate to their Mg2z ion in different ways.
There have been a number of different attempts to represent the
complexities of colour numerically, for a number of different
purposes. These are models that allow us to describe colour,
without having to deal with the underlying physics or reality of
colour. Probably the best known of these are RGB (Red, Green,
Blue) or HSV (Hue, Saturation, Value), both of which are additive
colour models appropriate for describing colour on a display
screen. CYMK (Cyan, Yellow, Magenta and Black) is a subtractive
colour model and commonly used for printing.
Collectively these representation schemes are known as colour
models. That none of these schemes has become predominant
reflects both their different uses and the preferences of different
user groups.
For the ontology builder, this leaves us with a difficult choice:
1. We bless one of the colour models, substituting the model for
the underlying physics and do not describe the others.
2. We describe all of the colour models, but do not describe that
they are part of a colour model.
3. We explicitly describe the reality of the physics, biology and the
relationship to the different colour models, reflecting the
practise of describing colour in much of science.
Currently, considering the PATO ontology, which is docu-
mented as being built according to realist principles, the first
approach has been taken, using the HSV scheme. So, PATO has a
term Color Hue (PATO:0000015) that is defined as:
‘‘A chromatic scalar-circular quality inhering in an object that manifests
in an observer by virtue of the dominant wavelength of the visible light;
may be subject to fiat divisions, typically into 7 or 8 spectra.’’
Using this model, PATO describes red (PATO:0000322) as:
‘‘A color hue with high wavelength of the long-wave end of the visible
spectrum, evoked in the human observer by radiant energy with
wavelengths of approximately 630 to 750 nanometers.’’
This modelling approach has a number of limitations.
N The decision to choose one colour model or the other is
arbitrary. While there are reasonable justifications for the use
of HSV as opposed to, for example, RGB, there is no a priori
justification for use of an additive colour model as opposed to a
subtractive model. Both are valid, for different usage; in
general, reflective colour is more common in biology (e.g.
pigmentation) than emitted colour (e.g. fluorescence) which
would suggest that subtractive models are more generally
applicable, but a full treatment requires both.
N There are no terms which can be used to express data
described according to other colour models, necessitating a
transformation between the different models into the officially
‘‘blessed’’ version during application of the ontology. These
transformations may be lossy and not fully reversible.
The second approach is also possible. This would allow
expression of data in multiple colour models, however:
N The ontology would tend to get rather confusing as more
colour models are added; colour would have children ‘‘Hue’’,
‘‘Red’’ and ‘‘Cyan’’ and seven other sibling terms.
N It is not clear which terms comprise a colour model: do values
for ‘‘Hue’’, ‘‘Green’’ and ‘‘Magenta’’ specify a colour?
N It is not clear whether terms that occur in the other contexts
are equivalent. Is ‘‘Red as in RGB’’ the same or different as
Red (PATO:0000322)? Is ‘‘Hue as in HSV’’ the same or
different from ‘‘Hue as in HSL’’ (HSL is another additive
colour model).
The third approach does not suffer from the limitations
described. We suggest from this analysis that it is necessary, if
unfortunate, for some qualities to be explicitly described with
multiple representations. To avoid confusion, the universal quality,
colour, would need to be explicitly described as having multiple
valid models. Yet, realism argues that we should not do this, as
colour is real and not a model; more over, the focus on realism
means that the documentation does not describe the choices that
have been made, nor refer to the relationship between Color Hue
(PATO:0000015) and ‘‘Hue as in HSV’’. In short, realism has
limited our ability to represent colour.
Related Examples. There are many different examples of
this issue; having two or more models to describe the same part of
reality is common. The distance between two markers on a
chromosome can be measured using (one of a number of) genetic
techniques. Some qualities have a bewildering array of different
measurements associated with them; Wikipedia, for example, lists
13 different measurements of concentration such as molarity
or gm{3.
Realism and Biology
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This issue has been previously recognised. In computing
science, explicitly modelling one model in another is a form of
metamodelling. Other, non-realist, upper-ontologies such as DOLCE
use the concept of Quale to describe a cognitive abstraction
(such as Colour), including those over a physical quality (such as
the spectral properties of reflected light) [21].
Sequences and the Central Dogma
The central dogma of molecular biology suggests that all genetic
information is encoded in the DNA of a cell, as the ordered
nucleotides that comprise the DNA. RNA is transcribed from this
DNA. The RNA molecule also has a defined order of nucleotides
related to the DNA. Finally the RNA is translated into protein.
Consider an ontology describing these entities. First, the DNA
molecule has a number of properties; as well as physical
dimensions (discussed further in ‘‘The limits of consistency’’),
including a length expressed in metres, it consists of a number of
monomeric units. So, for example, we might say a DNA molecule
with a series of nucleotide residues represented as ‘GATC’
hasMonomericPart 4.
This causes a slight worry from a realist perspective; the
number 4 may not be a realist universal. There are no instances
of 4. In this case, the number 4 is being used to describe a part of
reality, so this is allowable in a realist ontology. Alternatively, we
could describe the same reality using units (traditionally base-
pairs or bp). Therefore, the DNA molecule hasPolymer-
Length 4bp.
Accepting the use of natural numbers in this way, also means
that we accept the use of sets and sequences to describe reality.
One definition of 4 is a sequence. Stating that the DNA molecule
represented with the sequence ‘GATC’ hasPolymerLength
4bp is equivalent, therefore, to stating that it hasSequence
‘NNNN’ where ‘N’ is any nucleotide residue.
It should be noted, however, that the usefulness of these
statements stems from our implicit knowledge. The number 4 is a
natural number, so hasMonomericPart 4.2 is not possible. If
a new monomer is attached to our DNA molecule, it will now
hasMonomericPart 5, because the natural numbers are
additive. We understand the operation of natural numbers as
part of our shared, background knowledge, and we can apply this
knowledge here.
Having described that the DNA molecule represented as
‘GATC’ hasPolymerLength 4 (or hasSequence ‘NNNN’)
we might wish to be more specific about the order of nucleotide
residues and state hasSequence ‘GATC’, The implicit back-
ground knowledge we used previously about the natural numbers
still applies here.
Next consider the process of transcription. The previous
discussion about DNA likewise applies to RNA. The RNA
molecule will, however, hasSequence ‘GAUL’, as RNA uses a
different set of bases to DNA. Mathematically, one sequence can
be determined from the other by applying a mapping; though the
mapping is a human activity, not a representation of biochemical
reality. To describe this, we have two options:
N Taking the realist approach, we can continue to rely on the
implicit knowledge of the biologist, as we have previously relied
on an implicit understanding of the natural numbers.
N We can be explicit about the properties of these sequences
(additional to those properties shared with the naturals). We
can talk about non-real world concepts such as alphabets,
transformations and how these map to the real entities
involved.
It should be noted that the former severely limits the ability to
describe the central dogma. The transformation of DNA to RNA
sequence is simple, but the transformation of RNA to protein is
more complex. Again, the choice is between representing reality or
representing how we practise science.
Related examples. The issues relating to sequences are fairly
general. In computer science terms, these are abstract data types.
The DNA sequence is a kind of sequence with special properties (a
limited alphabet). Many of the physical quantities in science have
special properties in this way. Consider:
Temperature. While these look like positive real numbers,
temperatures are only meaningfully subtracting from each other,
which gives information about heat-flow between two bodies.
Other operations (addition, multiplication) which are useful for
real numbers have little meaning for temperature.
Recombination Distance. These look like probabilities but
are not, requiring a transformation to add.
There is a limitation on the ability to use abstract data types
within a given ontology language; in most cases, the expressivity of
the language will not allow arbitrary mathematical relations. Some
languages, such as OWL, for example, provide ‘‘concrete
domains’’; these provide extension points within the ontology
language where, for example, the special properties of temperature
could be represented; other languages do not. In either case, there
are limitations to these capabilities; for example, the constraint and
behaviour of a concrete domain needs to be interpreted with its
own semantics within a reasoner, rather than expressed explicitly
within the ontology. It may make more sense in many
circumstances to describe the existence of a mathematical model
as discussed in ‘‘To go where science has gone before’’.
The limitations of computers
Modelling continuous properties is a common problem in
ontological engineering. For example, according to statistics the
western world is now facing an obesity epidemic; in short many or
most of us weigh too much. Understanding, however, exactly what
‘‘too much’’ means is not necessarily simple; a common technique
to use is body mass index (BMI)—body weight divided by square
of the height, which is a continuous value. The BMI range is split
into 4 categories: Obese (w30), Overweight (w25), Normal
(w18.5) and Underweight (v18.5). These categories represent
ranges of the value of BMI.
This data simplification has many justifications. On an
individual basis, the BMI is not a particularly accurate measure,
so the simplification does not lose much accuracy. It is also easier
to describe to patients, for whom a ‘‘BMI of 25’’ will be less
comprehensible than being ‘‘overweight’’.
Modelling some of this is straight-forward. Height and weight
are modelled as properties of the individual. The BMI would
therefore appear to be a property of the individual as it is a
restatement of two existing properties. It would appear, therefore,
that the category into which an individual falls should also be a
property of the individual.
Consider the values of the property next. These categories are
an abstraction over the real-world properties. Although, height as
an integer value is expressed using a non-real-world entity, it is a
description of a part of reality. A range, however, in the BMI does
not describe part of reality in the same sense. There are no
instances of BMI ‘‘Obese’’. In a realist ontology, therefore, it is
unclear what the relationship is between BMI Obese and the
individual person.
For the statistician or computer scientist, there is an additional
advantage to the simplification; four discrete groups have better
computational properties than a continuous measure. Database
Realism and Biology
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queries become easier to write, and quicker to run. This is also true
for the ontology builder; simplifying the real-world may fulfil the
needs of an application for which the ontology is built, while
avoiding unnecessary complexity. This is a widely used method for
representing partitions of continuous values, the appropriately
named value partition [22].
In the case of BMI there is a pre-existing social agreement
toward a set of categories; however, even in the absence of such an
agreement, the ontology builder might wish to represent a
continuous range as a value partition to decrease the complexity
of their ontology. The value partition is useful, but many of the
concepts involved are not realist universals. The choice, then, is
modelling ‘‘reality’’ and modelling a simplification that is easier to
use and has better computational properties.
Related Examples. Splitting the two cases, there are many
examples of pre-existing simplifications. From medicine, there are
so many that it seems to be the norm rather than the exception:
hypo- vs hyperthermic; hypo vs hypertensive; hypo- vs
hyperglycemic. In many cases, these ranges have standard
interpretations akin to the BMI.
There are likewise a number of constructions or design patterns
that reduce complexity, extend the effective capabilities of the
language or simply provide standard solutions to common
problems [23].
To go where science has gone before
Many experiments in biomedicine require the measurement of
some physical property of a biological system. Take, for example,
the measurement of heart rate; in standard practice, this is
measured in beats per minute, and is calculated simply by
counting beats (b) over a time period (t) and dividing one by the
other (b=t). However, what time period is appropriate? We might
choose 60s, but this raises the question, what is the meaning of
heart rate over shorter periods?
Fortunately, there is a standard solution to this problem, which
is to define heart rate using differential calculus; so heart rate
becomes db=dt.
The derivative, db=dt, presents some problems from a realist
perspective. As noted previously (see ‘‘Sequences and the Central
Dogma’’), it is possible to associate real numbers with entities;
however, db=dt is 0=0. It is not clear whether this quantity is a
universal; it is certainly the case that the expression db=dt is not a
universal, yet such values and calculus itself is apowerful tool
within science and not using it within ontological models is a
severe restriction. We can describe this ontologically in three ways:
N We can model the real world entities involved – beats, time
and describe nothing else.
N We can describe rate in mathematical terms. In this case, we
are defining the heart rate as a mathematical abstraction.
N We can model the heart rate as a real world entity, db=dt as a
mathematical entity and explicitly state that db=dt is a model
of heart rate.
These different solutions present different advantages. The first
is consistent with realism. The second is consistent with the most
common definition used within science. The third is consistent
with both but it is unclear when to use which term (for example, is
Db=Dt an approximation of db=dt, a quantification of the real
world quality or both)?
In most cases for the description of science, the second option
makes most sense; conflating the mathematical model with the real
entity enables us to use the advantages of two different modelling
techniques without introducing the confusion of the third option.
Related Examples. There are many related examples from
mechanics, electromagnetics or chemistry; as with value partitions
in medicine, so many that they appear to be the norm. All of these
subject areas have direct relevance to biology and, perhaps even
more so, to the equipment used in the practice of biology.
Mechanical examples would include velocity (dr=dt) and
acceleration (d2r=dt2). Electromagnetics would include current
(dC=dt) and capacitance (dV=dt). Chemistry examples would
include rate constants and pH. In biology, population biology,
systems biology and neurosciences make wide use of mathematical
models. The lack of a link in realist ontologies to these
mathematical models is not free from consequences (described
further in ‘‘Discussion’’).
The more general issue comes not from relating to differential
calculus, but relating to pre-existing non-ontological techniques.
For example, taxonomy in the linnean sense. There have been
many discussions about whether species and high taxons are
reflective of reality; it is certainly the case that a number of higher
taxons do not reflect phylogeny [24]. Given that it is of uncertain
status, should we represent taxonomy as a quality of an organism,
an independent conceptualisation of the biologists or both?
The limits of consistency
Physical biological entities such as cells and organisms have an
extent in the real world. This paper’s first author, for example, has
a height of around 1:8m; a similar value cannot be applied
meaningfully to the electronic version of this document, although
it may apply to the paper that it may be printed on.
There are a number of different, well-understood mechanisms
for representing physical space. We can use a dimensional or
cartesian model, with three perpendicular lines with a linear scale.
We can use a polar model, expressing extent using angles and a
single distance. Modern physics has told us, however, that all of
these are limited models of reality; physics generally uses a four
dimensional Minkowskian spacetime model; here the axes are not
linear; motion of the observer down one will change values down
the others. Alternatively, at a quantum level, length is a probability
distribution.
For the ontology builder, this leaves a difficult choice and the
same choice discussed previously in ‘‘Models that represent
reality’’: Represent the reality physicists relate; bless one, ignore
the rest; describe their components but not their models; explicitly
describe them.
If the ontology builder is to be consistent, then, they should
make the same choice in both cases; if we describe colour models,
we should explicitly describe Minkowskian spacetime, quantuum
probability distributions, cartesian and polar systems.
There are, however, two important differences to colour
models. First, there is a strong social bias toward cartesian
systems. Secondly, within the scope of biology and the life sciences,
four dimensional spacetime or quantuum models confuse rather
than simplify; the relativistic corrections produce such small
differences that they are statistically meaningless; similarly,
describing a leg as a probability distribution adds little other than
complexity.
This leaves the ontology builder with two options:
1. We can build an ontology with a consistent relationship to
reality. So, having decided to explicitly represent colour
models, this suggests that we should also explicitly model 3D
space, 4D spacetime and the various co-ordinate systems that
are used to describe these.
2. We build an ontology with an inconsistent relationship to
reality. So, we might be explicit about colour models, but
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arbitrarily bless 3 dimensional space, using cartesian co-
ordinates.
The compromise here is very straight-forward. The first solution
retains its consistency to reality, the second is consistent with
usability and usage; for biomedicine, a 3D cartesian co-ordinate
system plus time is likely to be enough for the foreseeable future
and makes life easier in the meantime.
The Newtonian view of the world is the best model in this case:
it is good enough. When building an ontology for biomedicine, it
makes most sense to use this view as it will produce the results
required. If, in the future, biomedicine advances so that relativistic
or quantuum representations are necessary, then current ontolo-
gies will need refactoring; even then, this future cost is likely to be
offset by gains in the present.
Related examples. In the choice of units for measurement
for scientific purposes, SI units are to be preferred. It should be
noted, here, that there is a domain dependency; for an engineering
ontology, the use of American imperial units would be inevitable.
For most of biology it is unnecessary to distinguish between the
length of the calendar year and the astronomical year—the latter
changing with respect to variability in the motion of the earth.
There are occasions when this distinction may be important for
data integration in bioinformatics as leap years and leap seconds
show.
For an ecologist counting the number of trees in a sampling
square 100m by 100m, they will take the area as 10,000m2; The
surface is, however, neither smooth nor a Euclidean plane, so this
area is wrong in reality. For much of ecology, this distinction will
not matter. Again, there is a domain dependency here; whale or
bird biologists interested in migration patterns may well care about
the curvature of the earth.
Discussion
Realism has been held up as a methodology for ‘‘good’’
ontological modelling, and the production of more tightly defined
and consistent ontologies. In this paper, we have discussed five
different cases, with biological examples, that we might wish to
model ontologically; for each, we have presented different models,
describing the same underlying science. In each case, a realist
solution is possible, but places either limitations or awkwardness
on the models produced.
Building an ontology with a consistent relationship to reality
may help to enable interoperability [7] under some circumstances.
If, however, it disallows modifications for computability (see ‘‘The
limitations of computers’’), or requires arbitrary blessing for one
form of specification over another (see ‘‘Models that represent
reality’’) it may have the opposite effect.
Nor are the issues discussed in this paper free from
consequences. In ‘‘To go where science has gone before’’, we
discussed interoperability with existing scientific models. Mathe-
matics and physics have produced complex, refined and expressive
notation systems, representing a deep understanding of how
numbers and the physical world work. These are, however, not
being used in current ontologies and this results in a lack of
precision, errors and omissions:
Lack of Precision
The PATO term speed (PATO:0000008) which is defined as :
‘‘A physical quality inhering in a bearer by virtue of the bearer’s rate of
change of position’’
with a synonym of velocity; from this definition, we
cannot distinguish the vector and scalar quantities of velocity
and speed; indeed, it is not clear which of these two
speed (PATO:0000008) is. Meanwhile acceleration
(PATO:0001028) is defined as:
‘‘… the rate of change of the bearer’s velocity in either speed or
direction’’
which is implicitly a vector quantity, and contradicts the
statement that speed and velocity are synonyms. The
mathematical definitions (velocity as dr=dt, speed Ddr=dtD,
acceleration d2r=dt2) are precise, concise and accurate.
Errors. Similarly, length (PATO:0000122) is defined as a
quality; qualities have to inhere in Independent Continuants;
as a Spatial Region is a child of Continuant this means that
Spatial Regions cannot bear lengths. In short, in current
versions of BFO, there is no intuitive way of modelling the length of a
region in space.
Omissions. BFO is mass-centric; it is currently unclear
where many physical entities exist, examples including energy,
waves (through a medium) or EM radiation. Likewise, it lacks a
natural position for numbers (that have no particulars), patterns
and distributions. Yet, these entities are key to a physical
description of the world.
To our mind, these are indicative of some of the most serious
flaws of realism-based ontology building. It makes little sense to
replicate the models of physics using English instead of a more
precise mathematical notation. If BFO had been built using direct
links to a grounded physical model of the world, it seems likely that
these problems would not have arisen.
We have discussed a number of concrete examples where
building an ontology by considering realist concerns has
detrimental consequences for the model. We believe that the real
world entities and the relationships between them is only one
consideration among many: simplicity, usability, fitness for
purpose are equally important.
Taken to its most extreme form realism, it seems to these
authors, would produce models unsuitable for use within science.
There is a choice between a correct account of reality that does not
allow the data of science to be adequately described and a
description of reality that takes in to account how science is
performed. Fortunately, most ‘‘realist’’ ontologies are not really so:
PATOs representation of HSV for modelling colour is not a bad
decision; it represents a straight-forward, pragmatic approach to
ontology building, where the representation has been chosen on
the basis of a use case, not the entities as they exist in reality.
Similarly BFO uses a 3D plus time model of reality; it suggests that
length are properties of the entity alone, without reference to the
observer. This is not a true reflection of reality, but one which is a
good enough approximation for use within the biomedical
sciences; in short, usability and simplicity have been considered
to be more important in the modelling process than the
relationship of the model to reality. In accepting these compro-
mises, BFO has placed itself squarely as a computational rather
than philosophical ontology.
Despite these concerns, realism has made a contribution to the
field of biomedical ontology engineering. By emphasising the
importance of real-world entities and by encouraging a more
specific interpretation than the generalisation of a ‘‘conceptualisa-
tion’’, realism helps to avoid the introduction of unnecessary layers
of abstraction. A consideration of the entities in reality may be a
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part of an ontology engineering process; ontology builders should
have careful and considered reasons for diverting from modelling
in this way and that ontologies should explicitly describe through
annotations the terms that do or may divert from this view.
Ontology builders should, however, be free to make this decision;
the acceptance of compromise with respect to reality will result in
simpler and more effective knowledge artefacts.
Johansson [10] when discussing realism asks the rhetorical
question: ‘‘would you like to be treated for a physiological illness
by a (non-realist) physician who is not sure that there are human
bodies?’’ – (our emphasis). As scientists, our reply would be if their
survival and success statistics were the best, we would not care
whether they were a realist, a non-realist or a robot which
admitted of no philosophical position at all; also, using a doctor
who was strictly realist and thus cut off from much of the practise
of science (such as determining heart rate) would disturb many
patients. As bioinformaticians, we build ontologies to provide a
descriptive and predictive model of the wealth of experimental
data that is now available. In biology, the job of an ontologist is to
describe data such that it can be analysed. Naturally this entails a
description of entities in reality; it also, however, entails a
description of science, and it entails compromise; we overlook
this to our peril. The last 200 years of science shows the success
and strength of this position; it is on this groundwork that we
should build for the future.
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